Abstract Judgments about stimulus characteristics are affected by enhanced processing fluency that results from an earlier presentation of the stimulus. By monitoring for an episodic source of processing fluency, younger adults can more easily avoid this influence than can older adults.
such as fame in the case of a name (Jacoby, Woloshyn, & Kelley, 1989) , or to presentation conditions that do not actually prevail, such as longer viewing time or reduced background noise (Jacoby, Allan, Collins, & Larwill, 1988; Witherspoon & Allan, 1985) . Conversely, fluency produced by stimulus presentation conditions may be erroneously attributed to the prior presentation of the stimulus, leading to false alarms on a recognition test (Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; Johnston, Hawley, & Elliott, 1991) .
The problem of determining the appropriate source of processing fluency is analogous to the problem of source amnesia, in which information is remembered but its episodic source cannot be recalled or the information is attributed to an inappropriate source (Schacter, Harbluk, & McLachlan, 1984) . Difficulty with memory for source appears to be especially pronounced among older adults (Cohen & Faulkner, 1989; Hashtroudi, Johnson, & Chrosniak, 1989) . Similarly, the elderly appear to be less able than younger adults to monitor the source of processing fluency when making stimulus judgments. Dywan and Jacoby (1990) showed that among older adults, classification of a nonfamous name as famous was more likely if it had been read earlier as part of a list of nonfamous names. Because subjects were informed before reading the original list that it contained only nonfamous names, successful monitoring of the source of fluency during the fame judgment task would have prevented incorrect classification of the previously read names. In fact, younger subjects showed just this effect and were more likely to judge new, rather than old, nonfamous names as famous. Older subjects, however, produced the opposite result, suggesting that they were less successful in establishing the source of fluency as prior occurrence on a list of nonfamous names. In an experiment that used a very similar procedure, Squire and McKee (1993) found that amnesic subjects were unable to recollect the prior exposure of nonfamous names, and consequently were quite susceptible to the influence of past exposure in making fame judgments. In addition, Bartlett, Strater, and Fulton (1991) have shown that older subjects are more influenced than younger subjects by prior presentation of a face when making false alarms on fame and recency judgment tasks.
Susceptibility to the inappropriate influence of prior exposure to an item is not restricted to older adults and amnesic subjects. When operating under divided attention, normal younger adults have difficulty using memory for source as a basis for discounting the influence of prior occurrence (Jacoby, Woloshyn, & Kelley, 1989) . Divided attention effects obtained with younger adults might be taken as a model for the process of aging, by which it is assumed that older adults are less able to meet the requirements of dual task situations because of limited processing resources (e.g., Craik & Byrd, 1982) . This approach leads to the suggestion that source monitoring difficulty observed among older adults may reflect a general deficit in handling multiple task demands. Alternatively, the source monitoring problems among older adults reported by Dywan and Jacoby (1990) and by Bartlett et al. (1991) may be specific to the episodic memory requirement involved in monitoring for source, rather than to problems with dual task performance. The possibility that a memory deficit is responsible for source monitoring problems receives support from the fact that age-related deficits in dual task performance is not a consistent finding (Plude & Hoyer, 1986; Salthouse, Fristoe, Lineweaver, & Coon, 1995; Wickens, Braune, & Stokes, 1987 ).
In the experiments described here, we explored the hypothesis that older adults may be just as effective as younger adults at discounting the effects of processing fluency when doing so does not rely on episodic memory. We arranged task demands so that the effects of processing fluency could be avoided by relying on general knowledge, a skill that is maintained or even enhanced among older adults (Burke & Harrold, 1988; Hultsch, Hertzog, & Dixon, 1990; Perlmutter, 1986) , and at worst shows only a small age-related decline (Salthouse, 1988) . If avoidance of the effects of fluency is not compromised by general age-related deficits in processing capacity, older adults should show evidence of discounting fluency when task demands invoke a knowledge-based alternative heuristic.
Experiment 1
We examined the influence of task demands on the use of the fluency heuristic using a version of the fame judgment task developed by Jacoby and his colleagues (Dywan & Jacoby, 1990; Jacoby, Woloshyn, & Kelley, 1989) . Subjects initially read a list of famous and nonfamous names, and later were asked to classify a set of names as famous or nonfamous. Some of the test names had been read in the first part of the experiment, and consequently were expected to be more fluently identified by all the subjects. We attempted to verify this expectation by testing a subset of the names in a visual identification task. Subsequent use of the fluency heuristic in the classification task was expected to be revealed by a higher probability of classifying the previously read names as famous.
To evaluate the claim that use of the fluency heuristic would be influenced by prevailing task demands, half of the subjects were asked only to make a decision about the fame of each name. The remaining subjects were given the same judgment task, but also were instructed to explain why a name was famous when they classified it as such. This request for an analytic, knowledge-based assessment of evidence for a claim of fame was expected to provide subjects with an alternative to the fluency heuristic; the ability to generate some plausible reason for fame could be used as grounds for classifying a name as famous. Given that this alternative basis for judging fame depends on general knowledge, which older adults often can access as effectively as younger subjects, it was expected that both age groups would be able to reduce the extent to which they relied on the fluency heuristic to make fame judgments. Subjects were not, however, required to explain why a name was famous; they had the option of classifying a name as famous but reporting that they did not know the reason for fame. This approach made it possible to test for a spontaneous rather than a forced shift in the basis for making fame judgments.
The procedure used here differed in an important respect from that of Dywan and Jacoby (1990) and Bartlett et al. (1991) . In those experiments, episodic memory for prior occurrence was placed in opposition to a positive decision about fame by exposing subjects to a study list comprised of only nonfamous names. Younger subjects were better able to monitor for names or faces that had been presented earlier, and this information helped inoculate them against the influence of fluency in making their decisions regarding fame. In the present experiment, rather than initially exposing subjects to a pure list of nonfamous names, we used a mixed list of famous and nonfamous names. This procedure neutralized the role of explicit recognition by making it uninformative with respect to the fame judgment -a previously presented name could be famous or nonfamous. The instruction to provide a reason for fame, however, served to place the lack of general knowledge in opposition to a positive fame judgment, and thereby created an alternative to the fluency heuristic. The critical question was whether subjects, particularly older adults, would make use of this alternative basis for fame judgments.
METHOD

Subjects
Three groups of 48 subjects participated in the experiment. One group consisted of 29 female and 19 male older adults living independently in the community. Their ages ranged from 58 to 79 years, with a mean of 68 years, and all reported being in good health. Information regarding formal education levels was obtained from 30 of these 48 subjects. The mean level of education was 13.5 years with a range of 8 to 18 years. This group of subjects received $10 as compensation for their participation and to help defray the cost of transportation to the testing site on the university campus.
The two other groups of subjects consisted of undergraduate students enrolled in various university programs. One group of subjects was tested on a set of materials that differed from those used with older adults, in order to produce similar levels of discrimination between famous and nonfamous names. This group will be called the younger group. It consisted of 45 females and three males who ranged in age from 18 to 30 years, with a mean of 22 years. Their educational level ranged from 13 to 17 years with a mean of 15.1 years. The other group of subjects was tested on the same set of materials as those used with older adults, although their ability to discriminate famous names was not as high as that of the older adults. This group will be referred to as the younger-control group. There were 29 female and 19 male undergraduate students in this group. Their ages ranged from 18 to 29 years, with a mean age of 22. Although information about educational levels was not obtained for this group, the subjects were drawn from the same population as the younger group and can safely be assumed to have a similar educational level. In exchange for their participation, subjects in the two younger groups each received $5.
Half of the subjects in each group were randomly assigned to one of two instructional conditions for the fame judgment task. In one condition (fame-only), subjects were asked only to classify each name as famous or nonfamous. In the other condition (fame-why) subjects were also instructed to explain why a name was famous when they classified it as such, although they were permitted the option of saying that they did not know the basis for fame.
Materials
A set of moderately famous names was selected such that neither younger nor older subjects would be highly familiar or completely unfamiliar with the names. We began with a list of 500 names drawn from various sources such as encyclopedias and biographical dictionaries. This list was presented to a group of 10 young adults and 10 older adults drawn from the same populations as the subjects who took part in the experiment. These subjects were asked to rate each of the 500 names according to how familiar they were with the name. A four-point scale, with the points labeled as follows, was used: (1) certain that the name was famous and could indicate why the name was famous (e.g., actor, writer), (2) certain the name was famous but could not indicate why the name was famous, (3) uncertain whether the name was famous, and (4) certain that the name was not famous.
These data were used to rank order the names on the basis of the frequency with which they were rated 2 or 3 by subjects in each age group. The 120 names with the highest frequencies were chosen for use in the experiment. All these names were given a rating of 2 or 3 by at least six of the subjects in each age group. To determine whether there was systematic agreement across the two age groups with respect to the relative familiarity of the 120 names we had selected, the mean rating for each name was computed for each age group. The correlation between ratings obtained from the younger and older subjects, taken across the 120 names, was KH8) = 32, p <.01. A list of 120 nonfamous names was constructed by independently selecting a set of first names and a set of last names from a local telephone book. First and last names were selected and paired to match a famous name on the basis of gender and ethnicity. For example, Alain LaBerge (nonfamous) was matched with Francois Duvalier (famous), and Eva Wilkes (nonfamous) was matched with Peggy Ashcroft (famous).
Two sets of 120 names, 60 famous and 60 nonfamous in each, were established by random assignment from the famous and nonfamous names lists. One set was presented to subjects during the first phase of the experiment; the other set received no prior exposure. Presentation of one set or the other in the first phase was counterbalanced across subjects. Within each set, 20 famous and 20 nonfamous names were randomly assigned for use in the visual identification task, and the remaining 40 of each type were reserved for use in the fame judgment task.
After the older and younger-control groups had been tested, we discovered that our efforts to equate the two age groups with respect to familiarity with the famous names had not succeeded. The older subjects were better able to discriminate the famous names. Using the data obtained from the younger-control group, we identified 36 of the famous names that were especially unlikely to be familiar to younger adults. An additional set of famous names was selected and pilot tested with a group of university students. From these names we selected a set of 36 replacement names with greater familiarity than the original 36 we had identified. The younger group of subjects was then tested in the same manner as the older and younger-control groups, except that the revised list of famous names with the 36 replacements was used.
Procedure
Subjects were tested individually in a single session consisting of three phases and lasting approximately 60 to 90 min. Instructions for each task were read aloud by the experimenter while the subject followed a printed version. The first phase of the experiment consisted of initial presentation of a set of names. Subjects were shown a randomly ordered series of 60 famous and 60 nonfamous names typed individually on index cards and exposed for 5 s each. The task was to read each one silently. Subjects were informed that they did not have to try to remember the names and that they might recognize some of the names in the set. Following the list of names, subjects were presented two lists of 120 letter strings with each list typed on a separate page. These materials were presented as part of a task involving lexical judgments that will not be discussed here. For one list subjects were instructed to read the letter strings silently and to place a check mark beside strings consisting of more than two syllables and a cross beside strings consisting of one or two syllables. For the other list subjects were asked to read each letter string aloud.
In the second phase of the experiment, subjects performed a visual identification task presented on an Apple 11+ microcomputer equipped with a green video monitor, a standard keyboard and a keypad with three keys exposed. The right-hand key on the keypad was labeled YES, the left-hand key was labeled NO, and the middle key was not labeled. The task consisted of identifying a series of names. Each name was presented in a visually degraded display that changed over time to reveal the item more clearly. The task was to press any of the keys on the keypad as soon as the name could be identified and then to say the name aloud. Degraded displays were produced by alternating a clear presentation of the item with presentation of a mask consisting of a random pattern of dots. The mask was 23 characters long, extending at least one character position beyond the beginning and end of each target. On each trial the initial presentation durations for the mask and target were 167 ms and 17 ms respectively. The mask and target were alternately presented until the subject pressed a response key to terminate the display. After every set of four mask-target presentations the duration for the mask was decreased by 17 ms and the duration for the target was increased by 17 ms. These alterations were made without interrupting the sequence of presentations. When durations of 17 ms and 167 ms for the mask and target, respectively, had been reached, no further adjustments to durations were made. The impression produced by this display was one of a printed item gradually emerging from a noisy background (Feustel, Shiffrin, & Salasoo, 1983) .
When the subject pressed a response button, the screen was erased and a row of four question marks appeared in the center of the screen signaling the subject to name the item. The computer recorded the elapsed time between onset of the display and the key press that terminated the display. The experimenter pressed an appropriate key on the computer keyboard, out of the subject's view, to record the correctness of the verbal response. A series of 40 famous and 40 nonfamous names were presented in random order. Half of the names of each type had been presented in the first phase of the experiment. Following the set of names, the visual identification task was repeated for a set of 60 words and 60 nonwords, two thirds of which had appeared in the first phase of the experiment. This task was included as part of the lexical judgment study that will not be discussed here.
In the final phase of the experiment, subjects were presented with a fame judgment task. Subjects were presented a series of 80 famous and 80 nonfamous names in random order. Half of the names of each type had been read in the first phase of the experiment; the other half had not been previously presented. Each name appeared clearly at the center of the computer screen. Subjects were informed that they would be presented a series of names, some of which were famous. Subjects in the fame-only condition were instructed to decide whether each name was famous or nonfamous and to indicate their decision by pressing one of the keys on the keypad. The key labeled YES was used to indicate that a name was famous, the key labeled NO was used to indicate a nonfamous response, and the middle key was not used. Subjects in the fame-why condition were instructed to decide whether each name was famous, and to indicate why the name was famous. Rather than pressing keys to indicate their decisions, subjects responded orally, first stating whether the name was famous, then, for a positive decision, stating the reason for fame. They were instructed to say "don't know" if they thought a name was famous but could not remember what was the source of the person's fame. The experimenter recorded the fame decisions by pressing the appropriate key on a keypad, and recorded on a response sheet the reason given for each "famous" response. Upon completion of the session, subjects were given a description of the purpose of the study and some predictions concerning expected results.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The primary analyses we report included data from the older and younger adult groups, but omitted data from the younger-control group. We took this approach because, as shown below, the younger-control group did not discriminate between famous and nonfamous names as accurately as did the older subjects. It was deemed more important to equate the two age groups with respect to ability to discriminate famous and nonfamous names than to use exactly the same set of names for the two groups. Other analyses involving the younger-control group were carried out, and these are brought forward when they make an important contribution to the interpretation of the results of the primary analyses. A type I error rate of .05 was used in evaluating statistical tests.
Visual identification task
To demonstrate that both age groups experienced greater fluency in identifying names that had been read in the first phase of the experiment, we analyzed performance on the visual identification task as a function of prior exposure. Two aspects of performance were of interest: response latency and error rate. The mean response latency and percentage of errors for each age group, as a function of type of name (famous, nonfamous) and prior exposure, are shown in Table 1 . The data and analyses we present are collapsed across the factor of fame judgment instruction (fame-only, fame-why) because the instruction was not invoked until after the visual identification task had been completed and an initial analysis including this factor indicated that it was not involved in any significant effects.
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) of response latency was carried out using each subject's mean latency for correct identifications in each of the four conditions defined by type of name and prior exposure. The analysis revealed that response latencies were reliably shorter for names that had been read in the first phase of the experiment (4.02 s) than for names that had not been read (4.16 s), F(\, 94) = 31.04, MS e = 0.059. The analysis also showed that famous names were identified in less time than nonfamous names (3.83 s vs 4.35 s), F{\, 94) = 475.26, MS e = 0.055, and that younger subjects responded in significantly less time than older subjects (3.70 s vs 4.47 s), Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Exposure effect was computed by subtracting scores in the prior exposure condition from scores in the no prior exposure condition.
F(l, 94) = 28.83, MS e = 1.954. There also was a reliable interaction between age and fame, F(1, 94) = 16.97, MS e = 0.055, indicating that the advantage for famous names was greater among the older subjects than among the younger subjects.
A similar ANOVA applied to the error rates for each subject showed that older subjects made more errors than younger subjects (1.7% vs 0.6%), F(\, 94) = 12.61, MS e = 9.11, and that there were fewer errors on famous names (0.6%) than on nonfamous names (1.7%), F(l, 94) = 16.98, MS, = 6.14. There also was a reliable interaction between age and fame, F(1, 94) = 7.17, MS e = 6.14, indicating that the effect of fame was stronger among the older adults.
Performance on the visual identification task provided support for the assumption that prior exposure to names enhances the fluency with which those names will later be identified. This enhancement was observed for both age groups, as evidenced by the lack of an interaction between age and prior exposure. The fame by age interaction found in the analyses of response latency and error rate suggests that older subjects relied to a greater degree than younger subjects on their familiarity with the famous names in producing identification responses. We cannot, however, be confident in this interpretation because of the difference between the two age groups in their overall levels of performance on both of these measures. Fame judgment task Responses in the fame judgment task were scored by computing for each subject the proportion of names in each condition that were classified as famous. This procedure yielded four scores for each subject, representing a factorial combination of fame and prior exposure. The mean proportions of names classified as famous are shown in Table 2 . These scores were submitted to an ANOVA with four factors: age, instruction (fame-only, fame-why), type of name (famous, nonfamous), and prior exposure. This ANOVA indicated that famous names were more often classified as famous than were nonfamous names (.61 vs .16), F{\, 92) = 793.38, MS e = 0.026. Previously exposed names were significantly more likely to be classified as famous than names that were not presented earlier (.42 vs .36), F{\, 92) = 84.43, MS e = 0.005. Prior exposure did not interact with age group (F < 1), so we conclude that both age groups were similarly affected by prior exposure.
The uniform effect of prior exposure across age groups is different from results reported by Dywan and Jacoby (1990) and Bartlett et al. (1991) , in which the effect of prior exposure was larger for older adults. The reason for the discrepancy is that in those studies, only nonfamous names or faces were presented for prior exposure. In the present experiment, both famous and nonfamous names were read earlier, so subjects could not use conscious recollection of prior exposure as a basis for classifying names. Other studies that have presented both types of names for initial exposure have obtained results consistent with our findings. In a sample of younger adults, Jacoby, Woloshyn, and Kelley (1989, Experiment 1) obtained a prior exposure effect somewhat larger than the one reported here. Moreover, Squire and McKee (1992) obtained equally strong effects of prior exposure among amnesic and control subjects.
One other effect, the interaction between instruction and prior exposure, was marginally reliable, f(l, 92) = 3.66, MS e = 0.051, p < .06, suggesting that the effect of prior exposure was generally greater in the fame-only instructional condition than in the fame-why condition. The interaction between instructions and prior exposure is of central importance to the issue of whether subjects adopted an alternative basis for making fame judgments. We expected that subjects who were instructed to explain why names were famous when they were nominated as such would be less likely to nominate a name on the basis of processing fluency alone. This phenomenon would be revealed by a decreased effect of prior exposure in the fame-why condition. Although this result was obtained, it did not reach the standard level of statistical reliability.
An inspection of the means in Table 2 suggests that the effectiveness of the instructions was not as great for the younger subjects as it was for the older subjects, although the three-way interaction that would support this conclusion was not significant. Because of our specific hypothesis regarding the issue of whether older adults would respond to the instructional manipulation, however, we conducted separate analyses of the data for the older and younger groups. The interaction between instructions and prior exposure was significant in the ANOVA applied to data from older subjects, F(l, 46) = 4.74, MS e = 0.005, but not in the analysis of data from the younger subjects (F < 1).' Estimated power to detect among younger subjects an interaction of the same magnitude as that found with the older subjects was approximately .70.
The interaction between instructions and prior exposure observed among older subjects appears to have been carried primarily by famous names (see the exposure effect for older subjects in Table 2 ). Although the three-way interaction between instruction, prior exposure, and type of name was not reliable, F(l, 46) = 1.09, we offer a brief comment on this observation. One might have expected the influence of instructions on the exposure effect to be particularly strong for nonfamous names because no true reason for fame is available for these names. We note, however, that the exposure effect for nonfamous names among older subjects was rather small in the fame-only I A similar ANOVA applied to data from only the younger-control group indicated that instructional condition failed to influence the effect of prior exposure (F < 1 for the instruction by exposure interaction). condition (.07), and it could be that a floor effect prevented a stronger instructional influence from being observed. For the nonfamous names to have shown an instructional influence equal to that observed for famous names, the effect of prior exposure would have to be nil in the fame-why condition.
The separate analyses of data from the older and younger groups indicated that the interaction between instruction and prior exposure in the overall ANOVA was weakened by the surprisingly small effect of instructions on younger subjects. Younger subjects are capable of avoiding the effects of fluency when episodic memory for prior exposure serves as a basis for classification decisions and subjects are informed of this fact (Dywan & Jacoby, 1990; Jacoby, Woloshyn, & Kelley, 1989) . Moreover, Jacoby, Kelley, Brown, and Jasechko (1989) showed that younger adults do not need to have this alternative basis for classification directly stated in order for them to avoid the influence of prior exposure.
The results obtained by Jacoby and his colleagues suggest that younger subjects in our experiment should have reduced their reliance on fluency in making fame judgments. The lack of a reliable shift in classification strategy among our younger subjects may have been due to a lower level of knowledge regarding the famous names we used. A source of evidence for this hypothesis would be differential ability of older and younger subjects to discriminate famous and nonfamous names. One measure of discrimination accuracy, based on two-high-threshold theory (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988) , is the difference between hit and false alarm rates. This measure was captured by the main effect of fame in the first analysis of fame judgments reported above, inasmuch as classifying famous and nonfamous names as famous can be construed as hits and false alarms, respectively. The lack of an interaction between age group and type of name in that analysis (F < 1), indicates that the two age groups did not differ in their ability to discriminate famous names. The mean difference between famous and nonfamous names was .47 for older subjects and .45 for younger subjects.
In contrast to the discrimination performance of the older and younger groups, the younger-control group had a much lower mean difference score of .27. An ANOVA involving the younger and younger-control groups indicated that the discrimination performance of these two groups was reliably different, by virtue of a significant interaction between group and type of name, F(l, 92) = 37.97, MS e = 0.022. As pointed out in footnote 1, the effect of prior exposure on fame judgments was not altered by instructions in the younger-control group. Thus, although the two younger groups differed with respect to discriminability of their respective lists of famous names, in neither group did instructions change the effect of prior exposure. By contrast, the younger and older groups exhibited similar levels of discriminability, but there was evidence for a differential effect of instructions. It appears, then, that discriminability of famous and nonfamous names is not a critical factor in controlling the instructional effect.
Stated reasons for fame
Further exploration of possible differences between younger and older adults in their sensitivity to the instructional manipulation was based on an analysis of reasons for fame given by subjects when classifying names as famous. Although both age groups were equally able to discriminate the famous names, their depth of knowledge about familiar names may vary. In particular, it is conceivable that the older adults were more knowledgeable about the famous names they were given, and therefore were more frequently able to generate a plausible reason for fame. If so, older subjects might have more readily shifted their basis for classifying a name as famous away from familiarity and toward knowledge of the reason for fame.
We analyzed the reasons for fame provided by subjects in the fame-why condition to obtain evidence regarding the use of this knowledge as a basis for classifying names as famous. For famous names, three types of response were possible: correct, incorrect, and omission (the subject claimed not to know why the name was famous). For nonfamous names only the latter two response types were possible. We computed the proportion of each type of response for each subject, based on the names that the subject had classified as famous. For each subject, a score was obtained for each combination of fame and prior exposure, and the mean proportions are shown in Table 3 .
The means in Table 3 suggest that older subjects were more successful than younger subjects at providing correct reasons when famous names were judged to be famous. This observation was confirmed by an ANOVA that included age and prior exposure as factors, and proportion of correct responses as the dependent variable. Older subjects were significantly more likely to provide correct reasons for fame than younger subjects (.62 vs .35), F(l, 46) = 26.52, MS e = 0.065. In addition, subjects were more likely to provide a correct reason for names that had not been presented earlier (.51 vs .46), F(l, 46) = 4.78, MS e = 0.011. The significant age effect in this analysis is consistent with the idea that older subjects relied more than did younger subjects on generation of a viable reason for fame before classifying a name as famous. The effect of prior exposure suggests, however, that this strategy was somewhat compromised by the prior exposure of names. The fluency heuristic seems to have been curtailed but not eliminated by the task of providing a reason for fame. The age effect is also consistent, however, with the possibility that older subjects were more knowledgeable about their set of famous names than younger subjects were about their set.
As a further test of the hypothesis that older adults made more use of an analytic basis for nominating names as famous, we analyzed the proportion of cases in which subjects claimed a name was famous but were then unable to provide a reason (omission). These instances were considered part of the signature of a fluency heuristic in which familiarity of a name can induce a subject to classify a name as famous, even in the absence of a (possibly incorrect) rational basis for that classification. We used the proportion of responses in the omission category as the dependent variable in an ANOVA with age and prior exposure as factors. Separate analyses were applied to data based on famous and nonfamous names because of missing data in the latter case (some subjects failed to classify any nonfamous names as famous). Both analyses indicated that younger subjects more frequently failed to provide a reason for fame than did older subjects, F(l, 46) = 28.14, MS e = 0.072, for famous names, and f(l, 37) = 4.58, MS e = 0.111, for nonfamous names. No other effects were reliable in either analysis (^s < 1). The finding that the older subjects used the omission category less frequently than the younger subjects is consistent with the idea that when instructed to provide reasons for classifying a name as famous, older subjects were less likely to rely on the fluency heuristic. It appears that older subjects were more likely to apply the criterion of having a rationale for classifying a name as famous, as indicated by their higher likelihood of providing a reason once a name had been classified as famous. Reliance on this criterion would have reduced the influence of fluency on fame judgments.
These analyses also suggest that, perhaps because of a lack of knowledge, younger subjects failed spontaneously to shift the basis for their fame judgments when instructed to provide a reason for fame. Alternatively, it might not have been lack of knowledge, but the possibility of omitting a reason for fame when classifying names as famous that prevented younger subjects from shifting the basis of their fame judgments. These two alternatives were tested in a second experiment involving only younger adults. Three groups of subjects were tested, two of which replicated the instructional conditions of Experiment 1. The third group was similar to the fame-why group, except that they were required to provide a reason for fame each time they classified a name as famous. The list of names was modified to include famous names about which younger subjects would be more knowledgeable than in Experiment 1. We expected that if lack of knowledge were responsible for the absence of an instructional effect among younger subjects in Experiment 1, both groups in Experiment 2 who were instructed to give reasons for fame would shift the basis of their fame judgments. If the key factor is the possibility of omitting a reason for fame, however, only the subjects required to provide a reason should show evidence of shifting the basis of their fame judgments.
Experiment 2 METHOD
Subjects
A sample of 90 younger adults was drawn from the same source as in Experiment 1. Most participated for extra credit in an introductory psychology course, but some participated in exchange for a payment of $5. There were 61 females and 29 males in the sample. Their ages ranged from 17 to 28 years, with a mean of 20 years. Thirty subjects were randomly assigned to each of the three instructional conditions: fame-only, fame-why, and fame-required.
Materials
A modified set of famous names was developed for use in Experiment 2, so that younger subjects' knowledge of the names would be more similar to that of the older subjects tested in Experiment 1. We began with a set of 160 famous names, some drawn from the set used in Experiment 1. These names were placed on a list with 30 nonfamous names drawn from Experiment 1. The names appeared in random order on the list, which was then given to a group of undergraduates under the age of 30 years. These subjects were asked to classify each name as famous or nonfamous and to provide the reason for fame, if possible, for any name they classified as famous. Based on the results from this sample, we selected 80 famous names so that the average proportion of correct famous classifications, taken across the set of subjects, was approximately .60, and so that when these names were classified as famous the average proportion of correct reasons for fame was approximately .66. These target values were used because they were the values found in Experiment 1 with older adults for famous names that had not received a prior exposure in the experiment. The selected set of 80 famous names, 80 nonfamous names from Experiment 1, and 12 filler names (6 famous and 6 nonfamous names) were used in Experiment 2. The critical famous and nonfamous names were divided into two sets of 40 names of each type. One set of 40 names of each type was presented during the study phase of the experiment. Assignment of these sets to the study phase was counterbalanced across subjects so that each set appeared equally often in the study phase.
Procedure
Subjects were tested individually in a single session. Names were presented on a Macintosh II microcomputer and responses were collected using a response box attached to the computer keyboard. In the study phase of the experiment, subjects were shown a randomly selected set of six of the 12 filler names, followed by a randomly ordered list of 40 famous and 40 nonfamous critical names. Finally, the remaining six filler names were shown in random order. The names appeared one at a time and the subject's task was to read each one aloud. Once a name was read, the experimenter pressed a key to remove the name and to present the next name. Prior to presentation of the list, subjects were told that some of the names were famous and some were not. They were also told that there was no need to memorize the names and that there would be no memory test for them.
In the second phase of the experiment, subjects were given a printed sheet containing 240 items that were a mixture of words and nonwords. The subjects were instructed to indicate the number of syllables for each string. They were allowed to work at this task for 10 min, after which they moved to the next phase. The purpose of this task was to make it less likely that subjects would clearly recollect the names that had appeared in the study phase.
In the test phase, subjects were presented the 80 famous and 80 nonfamous names in a random order on the computer monitor. Half of the names of each type had appeared in the study phase. The task was to classify each name as famous or nonfamous. Subjects in the fame-only and fame-why conditions were instructed and tested in the same manner as in Experiment 1. Subjects in the fame-required condition were treated similarly to subjects in the fame-why condition, except that they were told to provide a reason for fame every time they classified a name as famous, even if it meant making a guess.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Fame judgment task
Fame judgments were scored as in Experiment 1. The mean proportions of names classified as famous by each instructional group are shown in Table 4 . The proportion of correctly classified famous names given no prior exposure was close to the target of .60. It is also apparent from Table 4 that the effect of prior exposure generally decreased as instructions made more strict demands upon subjects to justify their classification decisions. Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Exposure effect was computed by subtracting scores in the no prior exposure condition from scores in the prior exposure condition.
An ANOVA was used to analyze the fame judgment data, in which instructional group (fame-only, fame-why, fame-required) was a between subjects variable and type of name (famous, nonfamous) and prior exposure were within subjects factors. There was a reliable main effect of instruction, F(2, 87) = 3.50, MS e = 0.040. Subjects in the fame-only condition were more likely to classify names as famous (.42) than subjects in the fame-why (.37) or fame-required (.36) conditions. There also was an effect of type of name, F(l, 87) = 3,023.57, MS e = 0.008, as famous names were much more likely than nonfamous names to be classified as famous (.64 vs .12) . The interaction between instruction and type of name was significant, F(2, 87) = 3.38, MS e = 0.008, indicating that the effect of instructions was somewhat greater on classification of nonfamous than on famous names.
Names that had been given a prior exposure were significantly more likely to be classified as famous (.42 vs .34), F(1, 87) = 168.87, MS e = 0.003. This exposure effect was larger for nonfamous that for famous names, as indicated by an interaction between type of name and prior exposure, F(l, 87) = 13.76, MS e = 0.002. Finally, the interaction of greatest interest, instruction by prior exposure, was marginally significant, F(2, 87) = 3.06, MS e = 0.003, p < .06, suggesting that instructions influenced the effect of prior exposure.
We also conducted two planned analyses to address the main hypotheses tested by Experiment 2: (1) whether the effect of prior exposure would be reduced by fame-why instructions, given that subjects ought to have adequate knowledge of the famous names used here, and (2) whether the fame-required instructions would significantly reduce the effect of prior exposure. Each analysis consisted of an ANOVA identical to the first ANOVA, except that only two instructional groups were included. In the first ANOVA, the fame-only and fame-why groups were compared, and in the second ANOVA, the fame-only and fame-required groups were compared. In each case, the only effect of interest was the interaction between instruction and prior exposure. This interaction was not reliable in the analysis involving fame-why subjects, F(\, 58) = 1.68, MS r = 0.003, but it was reliable when the fame-only and fame-required subjects were compared, f(l, 58) = 6.74, MS e = 0.003. This pattern of results indicates that lack of general knowledge was not the reason that the influence of prior exposure on younger subjects was unaffected by instructions in Experiment 1. Instead, the availability of the option to omit a reason for fame appears to have been responsible for younger subjects' unabated reliance on fluency as a basis for fame judgments.
The exposure effects shown in Table 4 indicate that the influence of the fame-required instruction on the exposure effect was carried about equally by famous and nonfamous names. This outcome is in contrast to the observation regarding older subjects in Experiment 1, wherein it was found that the instructional effect appeared to be due mainly to famous names. Note that in Experiment 2, however, the exposure effect in the fame-only condition (.11) was higher than that observed for older adults in Experiment 1 (.07), providing more room for the effect to move. Thus, we suspect that the pattern observed for older subjects in Experiment 1 was due to the exposure effect being near floor.
Stated reasons for fame
The proportions of correct, incorrect, and omitted reasons for fame provided by subjects in the fame-why and fame-required conditions are shown in Table  5 . The relatively high proportion correct among both groups of subjects indicates that, if anything, we erred on the liberal side in selecting names about which younger subjects would be more knowledgeable. Correct reasons were provided for famous names in over 80% of the cases, which exceeds the accuracy levels achieved by older subjects in Experiment 1. We can be confident, then, that subjects in Experiment 2 were at least as knowledgeable about their famous names as the older subjects in Experiment 1 were about theirs.
The proportions of correct and omitted responses were analyzed using the same procedure as in Experiment 1. First, an ANOVA with instructional condition (fame-why, fame-required) and prior exposure as factors was carried out. If subjects in the fame-why condition were more susceptible to the influence of fluency, they might be less likely to have the correct reason for fame available when classifying a previously exposed name as famous. The ANOVA failed to yield any significant effects, however. Second, separate ANOVAs for famous and nonfamous names were conducted on the omission data from the fame-why condition. The use of separate analyses for famous and nonfamous names was again motivated by missing data in the nonfamous condition, due to some subjects not classifying any nonfamous names as famous. Prior exposure was the only factor in these ANOVAs. Evidence for an effect of fluency on classification judgments would consist of greater probability of omission among items that were previously exposed. The analysis of omission responses associated with famous names revealed just such an effect, F(l, 29) = 4.53, MS, = 0.003, although there was no effect in the analysis of nonfamous names.
Genera] Discussion
The relative fluency with which a stimulus is processed can serve as an influential source of evidence when making judgments regarding various characteristics of that stimulus. We set out to test the hypothesis that older adults, like younger adults, can avoid the effects of processing fluency under certain conditions. In particular, our conjecture was that older adults would exhibit this ability when an alternative basis for making classification judgments relied on general knowledge rather than episodic memory for the source of processing fluency. This hypothesis was tested by suggesting the application of a rational criterion for making a judgment. In the fame judgment task, older and younger adults were similarly influenced by prior exposure of a name when the task required only a famous-nonfamous classification. Names that had been encountered earlier in the experiment were more likely to be nominated as famous. When the judgment task also involved explaining why a name was famous, older subjects were at least as likely as younger subjects to discount the effects of prior exposure. In fact, we did not obtain reliable evidence that younger subjects discounted these effects at all. In Experiment 2, younger subjects did reduce their reliance on fluency, but only when they were required to provide a reason for fame each time a name was classified as such.
In comparison to results obtained by Jacoby and his colleagues (Dywan & Jacoby, 1990; Jacoby, Kelley, Brown, & Jasechko, 1989; Jacoby, Woloshyn, & Kelley, 1989) and by Bartlett et al. (1991) , it is noteworthy that younger subjects in our experiments did not reliably change their dependence on the fluency heuristic in response to task demands, except under extreme conditions. The results of Experiment 2 rule out the possibility that younger subjects in Experiment 1 failed to shift the basis of their judgments because they did not have adequate knowledge of the famous names. In Experiment 2, younger subjects were at least as knowledgeable as the older subjects of Experiment 1 regarding the famous names they saw, yet they did not reliably decrease their reliance on fluency unless instructions forced them to provide a reason for fame. The availability of a "don't know" option when asked for a reason for fame appears to have been a more attractive alternative for younger subjects, and prevented them from shifting away from the fluency heuristic in making their judgments.
The most important conclusion that we draw from these experiments, however, is that older adults can escape or reduce the influence of processing fluency on judgments when alternative bases for judgments involve general knowledge. Rather than being constrained in this task situation by limits on general processing capacity, older adults were able independently to develop and apply a classification strategy that was based on their general knowledge. This result is important because it complements the results reported by Dy wan and Jacoby (1990) and by Bartlett et al. (1991) in an interesting way. In those studies, older subjects showed little or no ability, relative to younger subjects, to escape the influence of prior exposure. Only nonfamous names or faces were given prior exposure, and subjects were explicitly informed about this arrangement. Therefore, when subjects later made fame judgments, recollection of an item's prior occurrence precluded classifying it as famous. Older subjects were less able to monitor for source (an aspect of episodic memory) and were therefore more likely to misattribute their familiarity with previously seen items. Thus, instead of rejecting previously seen nonfamous names as nonfamous, older subjects tended to classify them as famous.
The present experiments, however, were designed so that recollection of a name's prior occurrence provided no information about fame; subjects were aware that the initial list of names contained a mixture of famous and nonfamous names. Not surprisingly, then, the two age groups showed similar effects of prior occurrence in the fame-only condition. But by introducing the fame-why instruction, we placed the lack of knowledge of the reason for fame, an aspect of general knowledge, in opposition to the influence of prior exposure. As expected, this manipulation reduced the influence of prior exposure, but except under extreme conditions, only among older subjects. In an interesting mirror image of the Dywan and Jacoby (1990) and the Bartlett et al. (1991) results, the availability of the option to omit a reason for fame prevented younger subjects from being sensitive to this opposition.
We offer two suggestions regarding the greater willingness of older subjects to shift the basis of their classification decisions. Before doing so, however, we wish to note that the influence of familiarity is a powerful one that survived even the strong requirement in Experiment 2 to provide a reason for fame in every instance of a positive classification. Nevertheless, a feeling of familiarity is a vague and therefore risky basis for decision making. The inability to accurately establish the source of familiarity contributes to judgment errors that can lead to embarrassing and even serious consequences (e.g., during social encounters or eye witness identification). Experiences based on failures to determine the source of familiarity may contribute to the cautiousness that has been observed among the elderly (Botwinick, 1984) . This cautiousness might be reflected in the way older subjects apply the fluency heuristic as a basis for judgments, and in their willingness to abandon the heuristic in favor of an available alternative.
Younger adults, however, can more accurately monitor sources of processing fluency, as Dywan and Jacoby (1990) showed, and therefore probably have less experience concerning the consequences of misattribution. Under conditions in which an analytic basis for judgments is available but not required (e.g., the fame-why condition), then, younger subjects may be more persistent than older subjects in their use of the less demanding fluency heuristic.
A second factor that could contribute to older subjects' greater willingness to move away from the fluency heuristic is that they may have experience with developing methods of compensating for cognitive processing deficits that generally accrue with age (Backman & Dixon, 1992) . For example, Charness (1981a Charness ( , 1981b found that skilled, older chess players were able to compensate for age-related declines in encoding and retrieval processes by adopting a more systematic search of the space of possible moves and by using a more accurate global evaluation of chess positions. Through their experience at developing compensatory strategies, older adults may generally be more facile than younger adults at adopting analytic or knowledge-based techniques as alternatives to nonanalytic bases for guiding behavior.
Conclusion
The results we have obtained suggest a new perspective on studies in which older subjects appear to be more strongly influenced than younger subjects by familiarity or fluency (Bartlett et al., 1991; Dywan & Jacoby, 1990) . A common aspect of the circumstances under which older subjects are more affected by familiarity is that alternative bases for decisions are not readily available or highly reliable, particularly for older adults (e.g., fame judgments, recognition memory). We have shown that the relation between age and application of the fluency heuristic can take on a different form when these constraints are removed. When making judgments about fame, older subjects were less likely to rely on the fluency heuristic if asked to provide a rationale for their judgments, even under conditions in which there was no reliable evidence that younger subjects did so. Under these circumstances, older subjects appeared to make greater use than younger subjects of an alternative heuristic based on the ability to generate a plausible reason for fame and that served as an alternative to the fluency heuristic. Most likely there are other domains in which older adults' specialized knowledge and skill could provide a means to de-emphasize the fluency heuristic in favor of analytic bases for decision making. In these domains older adults may be relieved of difficulties associated with monitoring the source of fluency and may perform at least as well as younger adults. modifierent pas serieusement leur dependance a la fluidite en identifiant les celebrites, tout comme les sujets utilisant le seul critere de la celebrite. Par contre, les sujets utilisant le critere celebrite et justification obligatoire furent beaucoup moins influences par l'exposition precedente aux noms, ce qui veut dire qu'ils etaient capables de reduire les effets de la fluidite. Ces resultats indiquent que si les sujets sont motives a reduire Finfluence de la fluidite de traitement par des elements qui leur permettent de juger en fonction de connaissances generales, les plus ages adoptent rapidement cette alternative. Les sujets plus jeunes etaient plus reticents a faire ce choix meme quand des connaissances generales adequates etaient disponibles. L'identification de cette difference reliees a l'age, dans la facon d'adopter une alternative basee sur les connaissances pour reduire la fluidite, contredit une precedente recherche qui stipulait que les jeunes adultes utilisaient plus facilement une source episodique pour contrer les effets de la fluidite.
